Today, complex-systems mechanisms and mechanistic explanation are very popular in philosophy of science and are deemed a welcome alternative to the decried laws of nature and to D-N explanation. However, starting from a relaxed, pragmatic notion of regularities and laws, I will cast doubt on their status as a genuine alternative. I will argue that (1) all complex-systems mechanisms ontologically must rely on stable regularities, while (2) it is not obvious that all such regularities must rely on an underlying mechanism. Analogously, (3) models of mechanisms must incorporate (and hence are epistemologically dependent on) pragmatic laws, while (4) such laws themselves needn't always represent mechanisms. As valuable as the concepts of mechanism and mechanistic explanation are, they cannot replace regularities nor undermine their relevance regarding explanation.
Introduction
Today, mechanisms and mechanistic models are very popular in philosophy of science, in particular in philosophy of the life sciences. Mechanicist phenomenon. Such explanations depart in numerous ways from nomological explanations commonly presented in philosophy of science. (Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005, 421 ; my emphasis)
Machamer, Darden, and Craver make a somewhat stronger claim:
In many fields of science what is taken to be a satisfactory explanation requires providing a description of a mechanism. (Machamer et al., 2000, 1) Fourthly, both groups of authors argue that even if there would be strict biological laws, D-N explanations would not be sufficiently explanatory. Explanation, they say, involves more than subsumption under a law or regularity. Laws or regularities do not explain why some phenomenon occurs.
Machamer et al. have it that activities are essential for rendering phenomena intelligible. A mechanistic explanation makes a phenomenon intelligible by
providing an elucidative relation between the explanans and the explanandum, i.e. by revealing the productive relation between the mechanism's set up conditions, intermediate stages and termination conditions. This productive relation is completely accounted for by the mechanism's activities. "It is not the regularities that explain but the activities that sustain the regularities." (Machamer et al., 2000, 21-22 ) They append to this that " [. . . ] regularities are non-accidental and support counterfactuals to the extent that they describe activities. [. . . ] No philosophical work is done by positing some further thing, a law, that underwrites the productivity of activities. (Machamer et al., 2000, 7-8 ) (Terminological prudence is in order here. In my terms regularities are ontological and cannot describe activities. And I do not adhere to laws as metaphysical entities that underwrite the productivity of activities.) According to Bechtel and Abrahamsen, subsumption under a law does not show why the explanandum phenomenon occurred.
Even if accorded the status of a law, this statement [concerning the ratio of oxygen molecules consumed to ATP in metabolism] merely brings together a number of actual and potential cases as exemplars of the same phenomenon and provides a characterization of that phenomenon. However, it would not explain why the phenomenon occurred -either in general or in any specific case. (Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005, 422) To explain why, scientists (biologists) explain how. They provide a model of the mechanism underlying the phenomenon in question.
In short, (M * ) and (M † ) are motivated by the apparent shortcomings of the concepts of strict law/regularity and D-N explanation (in the context of the life sciences). Mechanisms and mechanistic explanation are then put forward as an alternative to these problematic concepts. In this paper, I
will side with the mechanicists in their critical assessment of both strict laws/regularities and D-N explanation. I will also endorse the view that 'mechanism' and 'mechanistic explanation' are very fruitful concepts. But I will doubt whether mechanisms are an alternative to regularities.
Are mechanisms an alternative to regularities?
In this section I will show that both (M * ) and (M † ) depend on the concept of 'regularity' -at least prima facie. In section 5 I will argue that this is no coincidence: cs-mechanisms are ontologically dependent on the existence of regularities.
In definition (M * ) regularities are mentioned explicitly: mechanisms, it says, are productive of regular changes. In definition (M † ), regularities are not referred to explicitly. However, it states that mechanisms perform a function. Functions are best conceived of as dispositions. Dispositions always involve regularities. Hence, (M † ) implicitly refers to regularities.
Functions are dispositional in two ways. The first way is that proposed by the dispositional theory of functions Bigelow and Pargetter (e.g. 1987) .
(DTF) An effect e of a character c is a function of that character if it confers a survival-enhancing propensity on the creature having c.
Bigelow and Pargetter interpret propensities dispositionally. It is not required, however, that e enhances survival (and/or reproduction) in all individuals all of the time. The dispositional theory of functions is not unquestioned, however. The main alternative is the etiological theory of functions (cf. Mitchell, 2003, 92) (ETF) An effect e of a character or component c is a function of that character or component if it has played an essential role in the causal history issuing in the presence of that very component.
During this causal history, c must have been selected over alternatives on the basis of its doing e, and it must have been produced or reproduced as a direct result of that selection process (Mitchell, 2003, 96) . By its reference to natural selection, the etiological theory links functions to fitness, which is a dispositional characteristic. So either way, functions are dispositional.
(See also Walsh (1996) who proposes a relational account of functions which should cover both the dispositional and the etiological account.)
The second way in which functions are dispositional is compatible with both accounts of functions. Even if the function of x is to do f , it is not required that x does f all the time. The (or a) function of my stomach is to digest food, even if I haven't eaten for two days. The (or a) function of my legs is to allow me to walk, even if I'm sitting in a chair. This is true regardless of the reasons we have for attributing them these functions (i.e.
whether we refer to survival-enhancing propensities or to the causal history of organisms having stomachs or legs).
Since functions are dispositions, they presuppose the existence of regularities. Even if there is no consensus about the correct analysis of dispositions, all attempts seem to have in common that dispositions involve regularities.
(For an overview of the most prevalent definitions of 'disposition', see Fara, 2006 .) Roughly, a disposition can be characterized as follows:
(DISP) An object is disposed to M when C iff, if it were the case that C and Ψ, then it would φ(M ).
M refers to a manifestation, C to the conditions of manifestation. In the case of the fragile glass, M could be 'breaking', and C could be 'being struck'.
Ψ stands for the extra conditions that should be included in the definition or analysis of dispositions. The simple conditional analysis, which leaves Ψ empty, is victim to several counterexamples and large part of the literature about dispositions concerns the question what other conditions should be included in Ψ. (For example, David Lewis has suggested that an object is disposed to M when C if and only if it has an intrinsic property B such that, if it were that C, and if the object were to retain B, then the object would M because C and because it has B; see Fara, 2006, section 2.3 .) The φ-operator stands for the modal or probabilistic strength that should be included in the definition of dispositions. According to the simple conditional analysis, the object should always M if it were that C. Again, this makes the simple conditional analysis victim to several counterexamples. Therefore, it has been proposed to interpret φ less strictly, viz. habitually (Fara, 2006 , section 2.4) or probabilistically (Prior et al., 1982) . What is relevant for the present discussion is the following: even if we would allow for dispositions that are seldom manifested when their manifestation conditions C obtain, φ cannot be replaced by 'never', since this would result in a contradictio in terminis.
If the conditions in Ψ are satisfied, P (M | C) > 0. 3 3 If there are dispositions that are seldom manifested when their manifestation conditions C hold, the following may serve as an example. A lottery is being held with 1.000.050 tickets. The tickets range from 1 to 1.000.000, but there are 51 tickets with the number 666. In this case, on might say, the lottery is disposed to select 666 as the winning number So far we can safely conclude that both Machamer et al., and Bechtel and Abrahamsen define mechanisms in terms of regularities (either explicitly or implicitly). This raises a first question, viz. whether this use of 'regularity' is necessary or unavoidable. This question will be answered in section 5. It should also be noticed that neither gives a minute characterization of these regularities. They only describe them negatively: they are not strict. This raises a second question which I will answer in section 4, viz. how these regularities should be conceived of. Regularities are a blind spot in the mechanistic literature. This blind spot can be removed by means of a more adequate theory of regularities and lawfulness.
Pragmatic laws and regularities
Instead of rejecting the concept of natural law, Sandra Mitchell (1997 Mitchell ( , 2000 sets out to refine it. She, too, starts from the observation that the existing criteria for strict lawfulness are too restrictive, at least with respect to biology and perhaps also with respect to other sciences. Therefore, she proposes a pragmatic approach to the question whether there are laws in biology. (Again, 'laws' refers to (some special kind of) generalizations describing regularities, not to some alleged metaphysical entities producing these regularities.)
The pragmatic approach focuses on the role of laws in science, when a draw is made, even if the chance of selecting 666 is very low ( and queries biological generalizations to see whether and to what degree they function in that role. (Mitchell, 1997, S469, original emphasis)
The roles of laws that Mitchell focuses on are prediction, explanation and manipulation. If a generalization G is used for one or several of these tasks, it qualifies as a pragmatic law. (From this it does not follow, however, that laws are sufficient for these tasks. Perhaps some extra ingredient might be necessary.)
Mitchell contrasts the pragmatic approach for evaluating the lawfulness of biology both with the normative and with the paradigmatic approach. In the normative approach one begins with a norm or definition of lawfulness, more specifically the traditional criteria for strict lawfulness (cf. supra), and reviews the candidate biological generalization to see if it meets the specified conditions. The paradigmatic approach begins with a set of exemplars of laws (characteristically in physics) and compares these to the generalizations in biology. If a match is found, the generalization is considered a law. (Mitchell, 1997, S469; Mitchell, 2000, 244-250) It should be noted, however, that paradigmatic and pragmatic considerations also played an important role in the works of Hempel, Nagel and Goodman. Criteria for lawfulness were assumed to rank Newton's paradigmatic laws of motion as natural laws and statements about the screws in Smith's car as accidental generalizations. Also, the criteria had to be such that laws are the vehicles for prediction (Goodman) and explanation (Hempel) par excellence. So Mitchell's approach does not differ radically in spirit from the traditional one. The main difference, and also the most interesting one, concerns the new, gradual criteria she proposes for the ranking of lawful generalizations. (Mitchell, 1997, S475-S478; Mitchell, 2000, 259-263) Generalizations are laws if and to the extent that they can be used for prediction, explanation or manipulation. Therefore, they must be pro-jectible.
The function of scientific generalizations is to provide reliable expectations of the occurrence of events and patterns of properties.
The tools we use and design for this are true generalizations that describe the actual structures that persist in the natural world. (Mitchell, 1997, S477) Given that these generalizations will seldom be universal, we need to know when (in what contexts) they hold and when they don't. The interesting problem is not that biological generalizations are contingent, but how and to what extent. Therefore, if we want to use a generalization, we need to assess the stability and strength of the relation it describes. Stability and strength are two very important ontological parameters for the evaluation of a generalization's usefulness. (To these, Mitchell also adds several gradual representational criteria, such as degree of accuracy, level of ontology, simplicity, and cognitive manageability (Mitchell, 1997, S477-S478; Mitchell, 2000, 259-263 ). I will not discuss these criteria here.)
Stability What are the conditions upon which the regularity under study is contingent? How spatio-temporally stable are these conditions? And what is the relation between the regularity and its conditions (is it deterministic, probabilistic, etc.)?
Stability is a gradual criterion. All regularities are contingent in that they rest on certain conditions. These conditions are historically shaped and are to a certain extent spatio-temporally stable. Stability does not bear solely on the laws of physics. Only if contingency is interpreted gradually, Mitchell claims, our conceptual framework will be rich enough to account for the diversity of types of regularities and generalizations and for the complexity found in the sciences (Mitchell, 1997, S469-S477; Mitchell, 2000, 250-259) .
Strength also is a gradual criterion. (To my opinion, the gradual character of 'strength' is best expressed by framing this criterion as some kind of covariance or correlation -deterministic regularities being a limit case.)
Strength How strong is the regularity itself? Does it involve low or high probabilities? Or is it deterministic? Does it result in one unique outcome? Or are there multiple outcomes? (In Schaffner (1993, chapter 3) a similar interest in pragmatic considerations and a like allowance for generalizations of differing scope/stability and strength can be found.)
Mitchell's pragmatic approach raises two questions which I should deal with first. Firstly, the approach is very liberal and one may urge that it qualifies too many generalizations as lawful. More specifically, Mitchell's approach is often criticized for allowing for very weak and/or unstable laws. A first reason is that many scientific generalizations (in many different scientific disciplines) are called laws, while failing to satisfy the criteria for strict lawfulness. By contrast, their status as a law and their usefulness in practice can be easily acknowledged within Mitchell's framework. Theories of lawfulness that apply more stringent criteria run the risk of selling short these generalizations. The history of classical genetics provides us with a nice example of such non-strict scientific laws. In 1900 William Bateson was deeply convinced that it would be both useful and possible to discover the laws of heredity (Bateson, 1900) . This conviction was mainly inspired by the works of Francis Galton, who formulated the law of regression and what would later be known as the law of ancestral inheritance (Galton, 1889 (Galton, , 1897 . But at that time Bateson also got acquainted, via Hugo De Vries, with the works of Gregor Mendel (Mendel, 1933; de Vries, 1900) .
What is particularly interesting is the way Bateson conceived of the laws of heredity. He acknowledged that both Galton's laws and Mendel's law (at that time, Bateson did not distinguish between the law of segregation and the law of independent assortment) are subject to exceptions and have a limited scope of application. However, this did not dissuade him from holding to the label 'law'. Nor did he later change his mind, when ever more exceptions to Mendel's laws were adduced by the biometricians who rejected Mendel's theory in favour of Galton's (Bateson, 1902) . In the works of Thomas Hunt Morgan and his co-workers (Morgan et al., 1915; Morgan, 1919 Morgan, , 1928 ), Mendel's findings of segregation and independent assortment were called laws, even if they were complemented with systematic explanations of their failures (coupling and crossing-over, sex-linked inheritance, failure of dominance, . . . ). And even today, textbooks in modern genetics start with an overview of Mendel's laws (Klug and Cummings, 1997, chap- ter 3). Mendel's findings were certainly not strict laws, but there usefulness can be acknowledged within the pragmatic approach, as can their status as 'laws'. Much research in classical genetics aimed at uncovering the conditions for the different regularities, assessing their stability, specifying their strength, etc. Nothing is gained by merely claiming these regularities are not lawful.
A second reason for sticking to Mitchell's approach is that it also nicely fits actual scientific practice. Scientists invest plenty of time and money to discover (statistical) regularities that can be used for prediction, explana-tion or interventions. Granted, few of the resulting descriptions are called laws. But what is more interesting is the fact that the criteria used nicely fit Mitchell's liberality. In 1965, Sir Austin Bradford Hill famously addressed the problem of causal inference (Hill, 1965, 295 ). Hill's paper is still very influential today (at least it is cited frequently). Hill envisaged situations in occupational medicine in which our observations reveal a statistically significant association between two variables (a disease or injury A and conditions of work B) but where our background knowledge (the general body of medical knowledge) does not suffice to determine whether the relation is causal.
His paper was unquestionably motivated pragmatically:
In occupational medicine our object is usually to take action.
If this be operative cause and that be deleterious effect, then we shall wish to intervene to abolish or reduce death or disease. (Hill, 1965, 300) To be useful in reducing death or disease, an association needn't be strong:
We may recall John Snow's classic analysis of the opening weeks of the cholera epidemic of 1854 [. . . ] . The death rate that he recorded in the customers supplied with the grossly polluted water of the Southwark and Vauxhall Company was in truth quite low -71 deaths in each 10,000 houses. What stands out vividly is the fact that the small rate is is 14 times the figure of 5 deaths per 10,000 houses supplied with the sewage-free water of the rival Lambeth Company. (Hill, 1965, 296) The weakness of the relation between sewage and cholera (P (A | B) is very low) doesn't make it unusable for occupational (preventive) medicine. It underlay interventions to improve public health. To be useful in reducing death or disease, an association also needn't be stable:
Arsenic can undoubtedly cause cancer of the skin in man but it has never been possible to demonstrate such an effect on any other animal. (Hill, 1965, 298) Whether arsenic causes cancer in animals is of little interest if the intended domain of application consists of humans. Evidence from humans should suffice. To conclude, the case of Hill shows that Mitchell's approach nicely fits the pragmatic slant of occupational medicine (which, after all, is part of the life sciences). And it also shows that Mitchell's liberality regarding very weak and/or unstable pragmatic laws is a strength, rather than a weakness.
The case of Hill brings my argument to the second question that is raised by Mitchell's approach. Hill explicitly intended to distinguish causal regularities from mere association, but Mitchell's framework provides no means for making such a distinction. A regularity can be very stable or very strong, even if it is a spurious association. The distinction is favourable for two reasons. Firstly, causalists regarding explanation allege that all explanantia should cite (at least some of) the explanandum's causes. Secondly, there is widespread agreement among philosophers that manipulation requires causal relations. I will not take up a position regarding the indispensability of causes in either explanation or manipulation here. But in order not to lose the causalists of explanation and/or manipulation, I will distinguish between causal regularities and non-causal ones.
This distinction can be drawn with the help of Jim Woodward's theory. In Woodward's view, a generalization is explanatory if and only if it is invariant. And it is invariant to the extent that it "remains stable or unchanged as various other changes occur " (Woodward, 2003b, 239) . Different senses of invariance can be distinguished, but to most important sense is invariance under variables. 4 Invariance is a gradual concept. Some generalizations are more invariant than others, depending on the range and importance of the interventions under which they are invariant. But it also involves a threshold. If a generalization isn't stable under any interventions, it is noninvariant, and hence neither causal nor explanatory. (Woodward, 2003b, 248-249) With the help of Woodward's conceptual framework, Mitchell's concept of pragmatic law can be refined. Admittedly, Woodward defines 'laws' traditionally and he argues that lawfulness isn't of any help regarding scientific explanation (Woodward, 2003b, 166-167) . But this does not preclude us from joining the concepts of pragmatic law and invariance. (For more detailed comparisons between both frameworks, see Mitchell (2000, 258-259) and Woodward (2003b, 295-299) .) In the remainder of this paper, I will repeatedly use the following four concepts:
(P -regularity) A regularity is a pragmatic regularity (a P -regularity) if it has stability and strength.
(P -law) A generalization is a pragmatic law (a P -law) if it describes a P -regularity. It has stability and strength to the extent that the regularity it describes is stable and strong. It allows one to a certain extent to predict, to explain and/or to manipulate the world.
(cP -regularity) A P -regularity is a causal P -regularity (a cP -regularity) if it is invariant under some range of interventions. 5 an intervention on some variable X with respect to some second variable Y is a causal process that changes the value of X in an appropriately exogenous way, so that if a change in the value of Y occurs, it occurs only in virtue of the change in the value of X and not through some other causal route. (Woodward, 2003b, 94) 5 In footnote 4, interventions are defined epistemically, relative to variables. Nevertheless, the concept of intervention naturally extends to the ontic level, viz. as a manipulation of the objects that have the properties described by the variables.
(cP -law) A generalization is a causal P -law (a cP -law) if it describes a causal P -regularity. It allows one to a certain extent to predict, to explain and/or to manipulate the world. 6
Up till now we have seen that whereas cs-mechanisms are put forward as an alternative to strict regularities (section 2), they are nevertheless defined in terms of regularities (section 3). In this section I have presented concepts of regularity/law that more nicely fit scientific practice. Now the question regarding the precise relations between cs-mechanisms and P -regularities, and between mechanistic models and P -laws can be addressed.
The ontological relations between mechanisms and (causal) P -regularities
In this section, I will first argue that complex-systems mechanisms are ontologically dependent on (causal) P -regularities. No x can count as a mechanism, unless it involves regularities. Then I will investigate the reverse relation, i.e. whether there can be (causal)P -regularities without any underlying mechanism.
Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on the existence of regularities both at the macro-level and at the micro-level. Firstly, no x can count as a cs-mechanism, unless it produces some macro-level regular behaviour.
Secondly, to produce such macro-level regular behaviour, this x has to rely on micro-level regularities.
In the life sciences, reference to mechanisms cannot be detached from matters of projectibility. Thomas Hunt Morgan and his co-workers sought after the cs-mechanism of Mendelian heredity to explain both Mendel's findings and their exceptions in a systematic way (Morgan et al., 1915; Morgan, 1919 Morgan, , 1928 . Mainly drawing from findings in fruit flies, they explained definite macro-level behaviours (definite phenotypic ratios in subsequent generations of organisms) by referring to the behaviours (independent assortment, crossing over, interference, . . . ) of a complex set of parts or entities (gametes, chromosomes, factors or genes, . . . ). But Morgan et al. were not only interested in the fruit flies in their laboratories. They were interested in the mechanism of heredity in Drosophila and in other species as well. As evidence accumulated, both Mendelian inheritance and the underlying chromosomal mechanism were more and more considered a general phenomenon. In the end, Morgan formulated the theory of the gene (including Mendel's two laws) without reference to any specific species (Morgan, 1928, 25) . He likewise gave an abstract mechanistic explanation (Morgan, 
1928, chapter III). The case of T.H. Morgan illustrates not only that talk
in terms of laws in compatible with talk in terms of mechanisms, but also that reference to mechanisms in the life sciences cannot be detached from matters of projectibility. Due to this concern for projectibility, Glennan (2002, S345) stresses that the behaviour of complex-systems mechanisms as a whole should be stable.
At this point, the reader might worry that metaphysical issues (about what a mechanism is) get conflated with epistemological ones (about the use of mechanistic knowledge). Such worry would be baseless. It is not that our concern for projectibility implies that mechanisms should be stable or robust. Rather, it implies that life scientists should search after robust mechanisms (it is a matter of fact that, to phrase it naively, they succeed in this). And if the concept of 'complex-systems mechanism' is to fit scientific practice (as is argued by Machamer et al. (2000, 1-2) and Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005, 422) ), it must incorporate this notion of stability. But, per definitionem, this comes down to the following:
(H-REG) There can be no cs-mechanism without some higher level (causal) by its component parts. Suppose now, that some part p i behaves completely irregularly: it may do a i1 , or a i2 , or . . . , or a in , but what it does is the result of a completely random internal process. There is no relation whatsoever to the behaviour of the other parts p j of the mechanism, nor to the previous behaviours of p i itself. Suppose moreover, that the same holds for all the other parts of the mechanism. Clearly, this would make it very unlikely for the mechanism to produce a macro-level P -regular behaviour, let alone a causal P -regularity. So unless the behaviour of its parts is sufficiently stable and sufficiently strong, i.e. unless it is P -regular, and unless these behaviours are organized sufficiently well, the mechanism's overall behaviour will fail to be P -regular. (I do not rule out that some of the mechanism's parts behave randomly. Only, then, sufficiently many other parts should behave P -regularly and their behaviour should be organized sufficiently well.) (L-REG) There can be no cs-mechanism without some lower level (causal) P -regularities (viz. the regular behaviours, operations, or activities displayed or engaged in by the mechanism's parts).
Again, this is stressed by Glennan (2002, S344) : a mechanism's parts must be objects -in the absence of interventions, their properties must remain relatively stable. Translating this to (M * ) and (M † ), these parts' activities or operations must be causal P -regularities.
Up till now, I have shown that mechanisms always involve both macroand micro-level regularities. But what about the reverse relation? Can there be a (causal) P -regularity without an underlying mechanism? In other words, can there be fundamental regularities whose stability and strength are somehow sui generis? Glennan (1996, 61-63) assumes or stipulates they exist. That is more than I need. Since the concept of cs-mechanism entails the concept of (causal) P -regularity, it suffices for me that their existence is logically possible. It might be the case that, as a matter of fact, all (causal) P -regularities rest on some (hitherto unknown) underlying mechanism -I see nothing metaphysically wrong in an infinite ontological regress of mechanisms and regularities. What matters is that the concept of fundamental P -regularity/law is coherent. If there are such fundamental P -regularities and P -laws, and if we want to explain everything, it follows that not all explanations are mechanistic.
The epistemological relations between mechanistic models and (causal) P -laws
The mechanicist may endorse the conclusion of the former section, while still holding exclusively to mechanistic explanation in biology and the biomedical sciences. After all, why should biologists care about non-mechanistic forms of explanation in physics? (Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that the fundamental regularities, if any, are or will be described by physics.)
Drawing on the findings of the previous section, I will show that mechanistic explanation cannot dispense with (causal) P -laws. To adequately describe cs-mechanisms, mechanistic models need incorporate -and thus are epistemologically dependent on -(causal) P -laws. By contrast, a generalization may count as a P -law without describing any underlying mechanism.
Large part of the complex-systems literature about mechanisms, especially the contributions by Machamer et al. and by Bechtel and as a model of a cs-mechanism. The trivial answer is that it should adequately represent that mechanism. As a mechanism is a system producing some behaviour on the basis of the organized operations of its component parts, the less trivial answer is that it should adequately represent (i) the macro-level behaviour, (ii) the mechanism's parts and their properties, (iii) the operations they perform or the activities they engage in, and (iv) the organization of these parts and operations. Let us call this the adequacy criterion for mechanistic models (see also Craver, 2006, 367-373) . So, by section 5, the model should adequately describe both the macro-level and the micro-level (causal) P -regularities. Hence, by definition, it should incorporate (causal) P -laws. Thus the adequacy criterion implies that all mechanistic models must incorporate (causal) P -laws.
But then the following question arises. Is it possible to gain evidence for a generalization's lawfulness without relying on mechanistic background knowledge? Can one be convinced that some generalization describes a regularity that is sufficiently stable and/or strong (for some particular application context) and can one assess this stability and/or strength without any evidence for some underlying mechanism? In short, can a generalization count as a (causal) P -law without referring to mechanisms? To be sure, this question isn't idle and moreover it has large epistemological import. It isn't idle since mechanistic background knowledge is useful in assessing the lawfulness of regularities (as I illustrated with the case of T.H. Morgan, see page 19), and is used so in many different scientific disciplines. It has large epistemological import since, given what we know from the first part of this section, the epistemological dependence of (causal) P -laws on mechanistic models would imply an infinite (and vicious) epistemological regress. To be sure that some model M is a model of a cs-mechanism, I would need to know that the generalizations G 1 , . . . , G n figuring in it are (causal) P -laws.
But then I would have to know the underlying mechanisms . . . It certainly doesn't do to rely on the existence of fundamental laws. Although this notion nicely fits scientific practice, it offers at best a pseudosolution to our problem. It only assures us that, if there is an infinite regress, it will do no harm. In the rest of this section I will face the problem head on and show that (causal) P -laws are not epistemologically dependent on mechanistic models. Mechanistic knowledge is not indispensable for the assessment of a generalization's lawfulness. Other means do at least as well.
A most natural candidate is performing experiments. Experiments are often ascribed the power to reveal causal connections and to confirm or refute claims about stable regularities, even if the relation between experiments and laws or theories is fraught with several problems (see Franklin, 1995 Franklin, , 2003 . 7 Moreover, experiments are very frequently performed in biology 7 In Franklin (1995, 196-204) The realization of an experiment often also depends on theoretical insights about the experimental (object-apparatus) system and the possible interactions with its environment.
Prior knowledge is needed about the object under study and about the instruments used. (Radder, 2003b, 165, 168-169) (EXP) In an experiment, an object is placed in some controlled environment. Using some apparatus it is manipulated such that it assumes some definite property X = x. Then, again using some apparatus, the outcome is measured in some (other) property Y . More specifically, it is verified whether there is some relation between X = x and Y = y (for some or all possible values x of X and y of Y ), and if so, what is its strength and how it can be characterized.
Let me shortly dwell on this description. The term 'object' has to be interpreted as broadly as possible. It may refer to one particular material object, or to some complex of objects, or to some sample of liquid or gas,
etc. An environment is 'controlled' if the relation between X and Y is not influenced or disturbed by other factors. To eliminate all possible disturbing factors (and all possible sources of error in general) is a very delicate and difficult task, large part of which depends on statistical analysis and datareduction (cf. Franklin, 1990; Galison, 1987) . I will return to this issue in a moment. Emphasis is laid on 'manipulation' since this, much more than passive observation, is considered a particularly reliable way to find out causal relationships. 8 Finally, apparatus are often indispensable in experimental some hypothesis h generates a prediction e, it always does so together with some background knowledge b. Hence, if ∼e is observed instead of e, either h is to be blamed, or b, or both. So one can always save h by blaming only b. The third problem is the fact that experiments are fallible and that different experimental results may discord. Franklin concludes that although these problems are important and impel us to treat experimental results carefully, they are not insuperable. Experimental evidence may serve to test laws and theories.
8 Woodward (2003a) heavily stresses the connections between experimentation and ma-designs. Sometimes these are relatively simple, but often they are very complex. They play at least three different roles: as a device for manipulation, for measurement, or to control disturbing influences. (In Radder (2003a) In many experiments, viz. in randomized experimental designs, disturbing influences are not screened off physically. Instead, experimenters endeavour to cancel out their influence by means of randomization. From the target population P a sample S is randomly selected. The random sampling procedure should guarantee that the subjects in S do not drastically differ from the rest of the subjects in P . In other words, for any variable Z, its distribution in S should not deviate drastically from its distribution in P .
Then the subjects in S are randomly divided into an experimental group S X and a control group S K . All subjects in S X are manipulated such that they assume some definite property X = x, whereas those in S K are not so manipulated (X = ∼x) -often they are given a placebo. This procedure should guarantee that the subjects in S X and S K most closely resemble each nipulation on the one hand, and causation on the other hand. In his view, experiments not only are an excellent tool for causal discovery and causal inference. To say that X causes Y also "means nothing more and nothing less than that if an appropriately designed experimental manipulation of [X] were to be carried out, [Y ] (or the probability of [Y ])
would change in value." (Woodward, 2003a, 90) other, except with respect to the cause variable X and its effects. (Instead of having only X = x and X = ∼x, one may also create several experimental groups, each with a different level of X.) Then the relation between X and the effect variable Y is measured.
Randomization is a technique that is highly context-independent. It allows to control for disturbing influences without even knowing them. This clearly shows that mechanistic background knowledge is no conditio sine qua non for experimentation and hence is not indispensable regarding the assessment of the lawfulness of generalizations. Fortunately, we escape the problem of infinite epistemic regress.
7 Conclusion: can mechanisms really replace laws of nature?
In this paper, I have substantiated the following claims. Firstly, cs-mechanisms as defined in (M * ) or (M † ) necessarily involve regularities. Their macrolevel behaviour is regular and it is based on the micro-level regular behaviours (the activities or operations) of the component parts. These regularities needn't be deterministic, nor necessary; i.e. they needn't be strict. It suffices that they have some stability and strength, that they are (causal) P -regularities. Secondly, even if it cannot be ruled out that all (causal) P -regularities involve an underlying mechanism, it is logically possible that there are fundamental regularities. Thirdly, no model can count as a mechanistic model, unless it incorporates (causal) P -laws. To adequately model a mechanism, it should model the regular behaviour of the mechanism and its parts. Finally, a generalization can be considered a (causal) P -law even in the absence of any knowledge of some underlying mechanism. Hence we do not face the problem of infinite epistemological regress. Randomized experimental designs allow us to assess a generalization's stability and strength without mechanistic background knowledge.
My arguments primarily addressed the theories of Machamer et al. (2000) and of Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) . This may raise doubts on the external validity of my conclusions. For sure, they cannot be simply extended to the mechanistic theories within the Salmon/Dowe approach. (And I will leave the question to what extent this approach is victim to my arguments untouched.) On the other hand, they are generalizable to mechanicists such as Glennan (1996 Glennan ( , 2002 and Woodward (2002) who openly endorse the intimate relation between mechanisms and regularities (see also Craver (2006, 372) ).
In Firstly, it is argued that in the life sciences strict laws of nature are rarely if ever discovered and that D-N explanation is hardly practicable. This is true (cf. footnote 2), but it does not follow that we should reject the concept of law. Although I am willing to give up the word 'law', it think it is more fruitful to revise the concept and to do justice to its role in explanation (cf.
infra).
Secondly, Bechtel and Abrahamsen argue that staking on mechanisms as real systems allows to avoid some hard ontological problems regarding laws. If by laws they mean some metaphysical entity producing regularities, they are right. But if, as is most probable (cf. Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005, 422) , they mean generalizations describing regularities, this is at best a pseudo-advantage. By section 6, even when staking on mechanisms and mechanistic explanation one cannot escape from questions regarding the status of (causal) P -laws and their relations to (causal) P -regularities.
Thirdly, it is argued that even if there would be strict biological laws, explanation in the life sciences still takes the form of mechanistic explanation in many cases. This is also true, but raises the question why mechanistic explanation is so successful. Mechanistic explanation is typically directed at regularities, the mechanism's macro-level behaviour (or derivatively at events that are the product of a reliable mechanism) (Glennan, 2002, S346-S349) . To explain such regularities, a mechanistic model should incorporate (causal) P -laws, as we have seen in section 6. I endorse the view that mechanistic explanation is a valuable concept. It provides a very solid account of scientific explanation without strict laws. But it would fail to account for explanation in the life sciences if it would abandon the idea of projectibility.
Large part of the success of mechanistic explanation derives from the fact that it involves (causal) P -laws.
Of course, some caution is in order here. The fourth (and final) objection states that explanation involves more than subsumption under some law or regularity. It is argued that laws or regularities do not explain why the explanandum phenomenon occurs (Bechtel and Abrahamsen), or that the explanatory power wholly resides in the productivity of the activities (Machamer et al.) . Again, I endorse that subsumption under a strict law is not sufficient for explanation. But two points may be raised in defence of (causal) P -laws. Firstly, some notion of productivity is ingrained in Woodward's causal theory of explanation (an intervention on X with respect to Y produces a change in Y (Woodward, 2003b, 98) ) and hence also in the notion of causal P -law. Secondly, even if this is not enough, i.e. even if (causal) P -laws not are deemed sufficient for explanation, it does not follow that they are not necessary.
